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Abstract
The paper studies the determinants of income distribution and growth in an
overlapping generations economy with heterogenous households. Our
framework has the following main features: (1) heterogeneity of consumers
with respect to wealth and parental human capital; (2) intergenerational
transfers are accomplished via investment in the education of the younger
generation. Heterogeneity in income results from the distribution of human
capital across individuals in a nondegenerate way. The human capital
production is affected by the ’home-education’, provided by the parents, as
well as the ’public-education’ which is provided equally to all young
individuals of the same generation. Due to investments in human capital our
economy is an endogenous growth model. First, we explore the effects of
technological improvements in the human capital process, upon the
distribution of income at each date along the equilibrium path. Second, we
study the impact of such technogical progress on growth and relate these
results to the income distribution inequality. Third, we provide numerical
simulations to quantify the effect of changes in the parameters of the model.
Simulation results include exact Gini coefficients and tax rate on labor
determined endogenously through majority voting.
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Endogenous growth models have attracted tremendous attention in eco-
nomics in the last two decades. The main emphasis has been on the role
played by human capital as an engine to growth [see, e.g., Becker and Tomes
(1986), Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990)]. As was demonstrated in
various ways in this literature various engogenous growth models provide an
extremely eﬃcient analytical tools in studying issues related to growth, con-
vergence and distribution of income in equilibrium [see, e.g., Loury (1981),
Tamura (1991), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994),
Fischer and Serra (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), Marrewijk (1999),
Galor and Moav (2000), Viaene and Zilcha (2001)]. A central feature in all
these studies is the way in which the evolution process of human capital is
modelled. The production function of human capital is a complex process
since education and learning occur in various ways; thus, the accumulation
of human capital or skills depends not only on parents, the ’environment’,
teachers and schools and investment in education, but also on technology
and culture. However, the processes of human capital formation used in eco-
nomic models concentrate, for tractability reasons, on very few parameters
[see, e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995)].
The aim of this paper is to study a certain process of human capital
accumulation and to explore some of its implications for income distribution
and growth in an overlapping generations economy. Education/training lies
in the heart of our process and it is composed of two parts: The parental role
which takes place at ’home’, mainly during the period of ’youth’, and the
’out of home’ schooling, or the ’public part’ where, in most cases, is provided
by the government and inﬂuenced by the ’environment’. Home education is
provided by the close family and it is carried out through parental tutoring,
social interaction, learning devices available at home (such as computors),
etc. In this case the human capital of parents and the time they dedicate to
teaching/ tutoring play an important role. The public part includes formal
education in schools, public expenditure in schooling, the ’outside’ social
interactions and other activities like the media etc.
It is well established in many studies by economists (and sociologists) that
education plays a signiﬁcant role in shaping the income distribution and in
shaping the growth process. We observe in the recent decades increasing
3awareness of governments in the education process and, consequently, in
enhancing investments to promote human capital skills. In recent years,
as the information technology advances and computors are being integrated
into the learning technology, we are witnessing some important technological
progress in the process of human capital formation. In this paper we shall
investigate the eﬀects of various kinds of technological improvements on the
intragenerational distribution of income and growth. We shall distinguish
between technological progress which aﬀects mostly the ’home-component’
of the education process vs. technological improvement which aﬀects mainly
the ’public-component’ of schooling and learning. The government in our
education process has two main tasks: ﬁrst, in organizing the public provision
of education and determining the ’level’ of public schooling and, second,
in ﬁnancing the public provision of education via taxes on wage income.
We shall not attempt in this paper, except in our numerical simulations, to
study the process which determines the ’level of public schooling’, but rather
take it as given in each period. Clearly, given the initial distribution of
human capital (and of income) some democratic process will lead to certain
decisions, based on the principle that education is provided equally to the
younger generation, while the taxes paid by each individual to ﬁnance public
e d u c a t i o nd e p e n do nh i sl e v e lo fi n c o m e . 1
We consider an overlapping generations economy which produces a sin-
gle good using two types of production factors: physical capital and human
capital. It starts at date 0 with some given initial distribution of human
capital and physical capital stock. Due to investments in human capital of
the younger generation, the economy exhibits endogenous growth.2 Each
individual lives for three periods: the ’youth’ period in which no economic
decisions are made but education is acquired, the ’working period’ where
this individual earns wage income, and the ’retirement period’ in which only
consumption takes place. Intergenerational transfers in our economy take
place only in the form of investment, made by parents, in educating their
oﬀspring and in the provision of public education. When looking at the
1It was shown by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) that majority voting results in a public
educational system as long as the income distribution is negatively skewed. Cardak (1999)
strenghens this result by considering a voting mechanism where the median preference for
education expenditure, rather than median income household, is the decisive voter.
2As in Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Fis-
cher and Serra (1996), van Marrewijk (1999) and others, production is constrained by
education and work experience.
4eﬀects of technological changes in human capital formation we ﬁnd that in
some cases a more equal intragenerational income distribution coincides with
higher output, while in other cases certain technological improvements en-
hance growth but make income distribution less equal. Basically, in this work
we point out that the way in which technological progress eﬀects the process
of human capital accumulation matters: If improvements occur mainly in
’home-education’ we ﬁnd that growth increases while equality in income dis-
tributions declines. On the other hand, when the technological improvement
aﬀects mostly the ’public-education’ then we witness higher growth and more
equality in income distribution.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a process of human capital formation which is part of an OLG
model with altruistic heterogenous agents and characterizes the equilibrium
of a closed economy. Section 3 studies the eﬀects of changes in the educa-
tional technology and externalities on intragenerational income distributions.
Section 4 considers the same counterfactuals but focuses on growth. Section
5 presents numerical simulations of a dynamic general equilibrium model
with heterogenous agents. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Human Capital Formation
Consider an overlapping generations economy with a continuum of consumers
in each generation, each lives for three periods. During the ﬁrst period each
child gets education/training, but takes no economic decisions. Individuals
are economically active during a single working period which is followed by
the retirement period. We assume no population growth, hence population
is normalized to unity. At the beginning of the ’working period’, each parent
gives birth to one oﬀspring. Agent or consumer is characterized by his/her
family name ω ∈ [0,1]. Denote by Ω the set of families in each generation:
3The role of human capital accumulation on income distribution was thoroughly studied
by many researchers [ see, e.g., Loury (1981), Becker and Tomes (1986), Galor and Zeira
(1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), Viaene and Zilcha (2001)]. Recent empirical
ﬁndings regarding the claim that growth enhances equality in the income distribution are
inconclusive [see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1994), Forbes (2000)], a fact which is also
obtained only in our theoretical work.
5Ω is time independent since there is no population growth. Denote by µ the
Lebesgue measure on Ω.
Agents are endowed with two units of time in their second period, one
being inelastically supplied to labor, while the other is allocated between
leisure and time invested in generating human capital of the oﬀspring. The
motivation for parental tutoring is the utility parents derive from the future
lifetime income of their child. Besides self-educating their own child, parents
also pay (by taxes) for formal education, to enhance the human capital of
their child. Consider generation t, i.e., all individuals ω born at the outset
of date t, denoted Gt , and denote by ht+1(ω) the level of human capital of
family ω’s child. We assume that the production function for human capital is
composed of two components: informal education provided by the parents at
home and public education provided by ’teachers’ and the social environment.
Informal education depends on the time allocated by the parents to this
purpose, denoted by et(ω) , and the ’quality of tutoring’ represented by the
parent’s human capital level ht(ω) . The time allocated to schooling by the
public education system is denoted by egt, and we assume that the human
capital of the teachers determine the ’quality’ of this contribution of ’public
education’ to the formation of human capital. We assume that for some
constants β1 > 1, β2 > 1, υ > 0 and η > 0, the evolution process of a






where the average human capital of ’teachers’ is the average human cap-
ital of generation t, denoted ht .T h i sc a nb ej u s t i ﬁed if we assume that the
individuals engaged in education in each generation, called ’teachers’, are
chosen randomly from the population of that generation. The parameters
υ and η measure the intensity of the externalities derived from parents’ and
society’s human capital respectively. The constants β1 and β2 represent the
eﬃciency of informal and formal education: β1 is aﬀected by the home envi-
ronment while β2 is aﬀected by facilities, the schooling system, neighborhood,
social interactions, organization, etc. A similar human capital formation pro-
cess to this one has been used in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994).
Statistical oﬃces of international organizations compile large lists of indi-
cators that describe and compare educational achievements across countries.
While these features vary from country to country and thus there may not
be a single theory that characterizes all the observed developments, three
6main common elements have inspired our framework of analysis [see, e.g.,
Park (1996), Burnhill, Garner and McPherson (1990)]. First, the production
function for human capital given in (1) exhibits the property that individ-
uals from a below-average families have a greater return to human capital
investment derived from public schooling than those from above-average hu-
man capital families. Also, the eﬀort, and therefore cost, of acquiring human
capital for the younger generation is smaller for societies endowed with rel-
atively higher levels of human capital [see, e.g., Tamura (1991), Fischer and
Serra (1996)]. Second, an important diﬀerence between our process of hu-
man capital accumulation and most cases discussed in the literature is the
representation of the private and the public inputs via time in the production
of human capital. Our approach suggests that the time spent learning ,c o u -
pled with the human capital of the instructors, and not the expenditures on
education should be the relevant variables in this process. This distinction
is important since in a dynamic framework the cost of ﬁnancing a similar
level of human capital ﬂuctuates with relative factor rewards. Third, in our
setting, human capital accumulation includes, besides parental tutoring, ei-
ther public or private education. To see the diﬀerence, consider the lifetime
income of individual ω , denoted by yt(ω). Since the human capital of a
worker is observable and constitutes the only source of income, it depends
on the eﬀective labor supply:
yt(ω)=wt(1 − τt)ht(ω) (2)
where wt is the wage rate in period t and τt is the tax rate on labor
income. Under the public education regime the taxes on incomes are used to
ﬁnance education costs of the young generation. Making use of (1) and (2),








egt = τt (3)
that is, the tax rate on labor is equal to the proportion of the economy’s
eﬀective labor used for public education. In contrast, under a decentralized
system, namely under private education regime,b o t hτt(ω) and egt(ω) are
7decision variables of agents and the individual’s budget constraint on private
education is:
τt(ω)wtht(ω)=wtegt(ω)ht
where the level of teachers’ instruction is chosen freely from the market
but their average human capital is the same as the economy’s. Aggregate









which, in this case, depend upon the distribution of human capital in
each date. Here, we do not consider the private education regime but focus
instead on public education only.
2.2 Equilibrium
Production in this economy is carried out by competitive ﬁrms that produce a
single commodity, using eﬀective labor and physical capital. This commodity
serves for consumption and also as an input in production. There is a full
depreciation of the physical capital. The per-capita human capital in date t ,
ht , (not including the human capital devoted to formal education) is an input
in the production process. In particular we take the aggregate production
function to be:
qt = F(kt,(1 − egt)ht) (5)
where kt is the capital stock and (1 − egt)ht =( 1− τt)ht is the eﬀec-
tive human capital used in the production process. F(·,·)i sa s s u m e dt o
exhibit constant returns to scale, it is strictly increasing, concave, contin-
uously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes Fk(0,(1 − τt)ht)=∞,F h(kt,0) = ∞,
F(0,(1 − τt)ht)=F(kt,0) = 0.







a3 [1 − et(ω)]
α4 (6)
subject to
c1t(ω)=yt(ω) − st(ω) ≥ 0 (7)
8c2t(ω)=( 1+rt+1)st(ω) (8)
wt = Fh(kt,(1 − egt)ht) (9)





where the income yt(ω) is deﬁned by (2) and human capital ht+1(ω) is
given by (1). The α0
is are known parameters and αi > 0 for i =1 ,2,3,4;
c1t(ω) and c2t(ω) denote, respectively, consumption in ﬁrst and second period
of the individual’s life; st(ω) represents savings; leisure is given by (1−et(ω));
(1 + rt) is the interest factor at date t.
The oﬀspring’s income, given by yt+1(ω), enters parents’ preferences di-
rectly and represents the motivation for parents’ tutoring and formal edu-
cation expenditure. Eq. (7) is individual ω’s budget constraint. Eqs. (9)
and (10) are the clearing conditions on factor markets. Condition (11) is a
market clearing condition for physical capital, equating the aggregate capital
stock at date t +1to the aggregate savings at date t.
After substituting the constraints, the ﬁrst-order conditions that lead to













, if et(ω) > 0
(13)
≥ if et(ω)=0 . (14)
The last equation allocates the unit of non-working time between leisure
and the time spent on education by the parents. The latter, et(ω), increases
9with the parents’ human capital hυ
t and the wage, net of taxes, at the future
date. Eq. (13) establishes a negative relationship between types of education,
that is, public education substitutes for parental tutoring as τt+1 increases.
Hence, for each individual there exists a particular value of the tax rate such
that et(ω)=0 . That is, when the marginal utility of leisure is larger than
the net future wage obtained from a marginal increase in the human capital
of the younger generation derived from parental tutoring. From (7), (8) and














Income distribution is a key economic issue and its importance is forcing
economists and policymakers to improve their understanding of its underlying
determinants. Evidence of a rise in income inequality has been observed in
a large number of OECD countries. There is a widely held belief that this
rise is driven by events like progress in information technology, integration
of world trade and ﬁnancial markets. Others believe that social norms are
crucial determinants of earnings inequality instead. The focus of this section
is to consider the inequality in the intragenerational income distribution, in
equilibrium, and relate it to the various parameters of our dynamic model.
We shall use the relations that we derived in the previous section to obtain
an expression for income at date t +1 , yt+1(ω). To that end isolate yt(ω) in















Eq. (17) determines income at the future date in terms of the net wage
at date t +1 , the parents’ and society’s level of human capital at date t,
the current education input (τt = egt) and the externalities in education.
Note that in this framework there is no direct dependence of incomes across
10generations. Likewise, it is useful to derive the evolution of human capital
from the ﬁrst order conditions. Making use of (13), the human capital of a













Let X and W be two random variables with values in a bounded inter-
val in (−∞,∞) and let mx and mw denote their respective means. Deﬁne
b X = X/mx and c W = W/mw. Denote by Fx and Fw the cumulative distribu-
tion functions of b X and c W, respectively. Let [a,b] be the smallest interval
containing the supports of b X and c W.




Thus, Fx is more equal than Fw if Fx dominates in the second-degree
stochastic dominance Fw.This deﬁnition, due to Atkinson (1970), is equiva-
lent to the requirement that the Lorenz curve corresponding to X is every-
where above that of W. We say that X is more equalt h a nW if the c.d.f. of
b X and c W satisfy: Fx is more equal than Fw. Henceforth the relation X is
more equal than W is denoted X À W. We say that X is equivalent to W,
and denote this relation by X ≈ W,i fX À W and W À X.
Throughout this section we shall assume that public provision of educa-
tion is determined by the government, say by elections or other social decision
mechanism, and it is equal to egt in date t and ﬁnanced by taxing labor in-
come at a ﬁxed rate τt(= egt). In the sequel we shall assume that v ≤ 1 and
that η ≤ 1. Now we show that higher provision of public education reduces
inequality in the distribution of income in each generation.
Proposition 1 In the above economy let h0(ω) be the initial human capital
distribution. Increasing the public provision of education results in a more
equal intragenerational income distribution in each date.
11This result may not be surprising since the public education is provided
equally to all the young individuals (of the same generation), while it is
ﬁnanced by a ﬂat tax rate on wage income. However, its importance lies in
the fact that it is proved in an equilibrium and that it holds in all future
periods.
Proof. Let us consider Eq.(18) for t =0 . Since h0(ω) is given, hv
0(ω)
and h0 are ﬁxed. By raising eg0 the distribution of the human capital for
generation 1, h1(ω) becomes more equal. This follows from Lemma 2 in
Karni and Zilcha (1994). Moreover, we claim from (18) that the average
human capital in generation 1 increases as well. Increasing eg0 will result in
higher h1(ω) for all ω and higher level of h1. Moreover, it also implies that
hv
1(ω) will have a more equal distribution [see, Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994), Theorem 3.A.5].
Now, let us consider t =1 .I n c r e a s i n geg1 will imply the following facts:
hv
1(ω) becomes more equal and β2eg1h
η
1 is larger than its value before we
increased the levels of public education. Using (18) and the same Lemma
as before we obtain that h2(ω) becomes more equal. This process can be
continued for t =3 ,4,....., which establishes our claim.
Consider some technological change that aﬀects the production of human
capital. We say that the provision of public education becomes more eﬃcient
if, in the human capital process (1), β2/β1 becomes larger without lowering
neither β1 nor β2. We say that the private provision of education becomes
more eﬃcient if, in the process (1), β1/β2 becomes larger while neither β1
nor β2 declines. A technological improvement in the production of human
capital may result in higher eﬃciency in home education or in public educa-
tion, or be neutral; namely, if the ratio β2/β1 remains unchanged while both
parameters increase. Let us consider now the eﬀects of each type of tech-
nological improvement in the education process on intragenerational income
inequality.
Proposition 2 Consider the above economy. A technological improvement
in the production of human capital, given by equation (1), results in:
(a) If public provision of education becomes more eﬃcient the intragen-
erational distribution of income becomes more equal in all periods.
(b) If the private provision of education becomes more eﬃcient income
inequality becomes larger in all periods.
12(c) If the technological improvement is neutral the inequality in income
distribution remains unchanged at period 1 but declines for all periods after-
wards.
Proof. Let the initial distribution of human capital h0(ω) be given.
Compare the following two equilibria from the same initial conditions: One
with the human capital formation process given by (1) and another with the
same process but β2 is replaced by a larger coeﬃcient β
∗
2 > β2. Clearly, we















where Ct and C∗
t are some positive constants. Since h0(ω) is ﬁxed at date






β1 imply that y∗
1(ω) is more equal to y1(ω). We also derive that
h1(ω) are lower than h∗
1(ω) for all ω and , hence, h1 < h
∗
1. By (18), using
the same argument as in the last proof, h∗v











1,h e n c eh∗
2(ω) is more equal than h2(ω). This same
argument can be continued for all dates t =3 ,4,5,..... which completes the
proof of part (a) of this Proposition. The proof of part (b) follows from the








hence, h1(ω) is more equal than h∗
1(ω) and h1 > h
∗
1. This process leads, using
similar arguments as before, to yt(ω) more equal than y∗
t(ω) for all periods
t. Consider now the claim in part (c). From (18) we see that inequality in
the distribution of h1(ω) remains unchanged even though all levels of h1(ω)
increase due to this technological improvement. In particular, h1 increases.
Now, since inequality of hv
1(ω) did not vary but the second term in the RHS
of (18) has increased due to the higher value of h1, we obtain more equal
distribution of h2(ω). Now, this argument can be used again at dates 3, 4,
...., which completes the proof.
Let us consider now another type of a change in the ”home-component” of
the production of human capital and its economic implications in equilibrium.
Observe the process represented by (1). Let us vary the parameters v and
η, which relate to the role played by human capital of the parents or the
’environment’. Since we assume that v ≤ 1 and η ≤ 1 let us consider the
eﬀect that lower values will have on the inequality in income distributions in
equilibrium.
13Proposition 3 Consider the process of production of human capital given
by (1). Then,
( a )C o m p a r i n gt w oe c o n o m i e sw h i c hd i ﬀer only in this parameter v.T h e
economy with the lower v will have more equality in the intragenerational
income distribution in all periods.
(b) Comparing two economies which diﬀer only in the parameter η.T h e
economy with the lower value of η will have less equality in the income dis-
tribution in all periods.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that h0(ω) ≥ 1 for all ω.
Since the two economies have the same initial distribution of human capital
h0(ω) the process that determines h1(ω) diﬀers only in the parameter v.
Denote by v∗ <v≤ 1 the parameters, then it is clear that [h0(ω)]v∗ is more
equal than [h0(ω)]v since it is attained by a strictly concave transformation
[see, Theorem 3.A.5 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)]. Likewise, the
human capital distribution h∗
1(ω) is more equal than the ditribution h1(ω).
This implies that y∗
1(ω) is more equal than y1(ω). Now we can apply the
same argument to date 1: the distribution of [h∗
1(ω)]v∗ is more equal than
that of [h1(ω)]v, hence, using (18) and the above reference, we derive that the
distribution of [h∗
2(ω)]v∗ is more equal than that of [h2(ω)]v.T h i s p r o c e s s
can be continued for all t.
When we lower the value of η, keeping all other parameters constant,
we basically lower the second term in (18), [h0]η, while [h0(ω)]v remains
unchanged. By Lemma 2 in Karni and Zilcha (1994) we obtain that the
distribution of h1(ω) b e c o m e sl e s se q u a l . T h i sc a nb ec o n t i n u e df o rt =2
as well since it is easy to verify that [h1]η decreases while [h1(ω)]v becomes
less equal. This process can be extended to t =2 ,3,...., which complete the
proof.
Consider two similar economies which diﬀer only in the initial distribu-
tions of human capital: one economy has higher levels of human capital but
the same inequality of human capital distributions. Can we compare these
two economies with their equilibrium intragenerational income distributions
over time? The next proposition provides an answer.
Proposition 4 Consider two economies which diﬀer only in their initial
human capital distributions, h0(ω) and h∗
0(ω). Assume that h∗
0(ω) >h 0(ω)
for all ω ,b u th∗
0(ω) ≈ h0(ω), namely, these two distributions have the same
14level of inequality. Then, the equilibrium from h∗
0(ω) will have more equal
intragenerational income distributions at all dates t, t =1 ,2,3,.....
Note that this result indicates that the initial distribution of human cap-
ital matters, hence a country that starts with higher levels of human capital,
not necessarily more equal, has a better chance to maintain more equality in
its future income distributions.
















Since h0 and h∗
0 are equally distributed, the same holds for hv
0(ω) and
[h∗
0(ω)]v,s i n c ev ≤ 1.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eh0 < h
∗
0 we obtain that h∗
1(ω) is more
equal than h1(ω) [again, see Lemma 2 in Karni and Zilcha (1994)]. It is easy
to verify from (18) that h1(ω) are lower than h∗
1(ω) for all ω.I np a r t i c u l a r
we obtain that [h∗
1(ω)]v is more equal than [h1(ω)]v [see Theorem 3.A.5 in
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)]. Also we have [ h1]η < [ h
∗
1]η.T h i s
implies, using (18), that h∗
2(ω) is more equal than h2(ω). As in our earlier
proofs it is easy to see that this process can be continued to generalize this
to all periods.
Let us consider now the variation over time of the inequality in the dis-
tributions of income. We shall demonstrate that under the assumption that
the tax rate is the same for all levels of income, inequality declines over time;
namely, in our framework the inequality in income distribution at date t+1
is smaller than the inequality in income distribution at date t .
Proposition 5 If the same tax rate applies to all levels of income, along
the equilibrium path the inequality in intragenerational income distribution
at date t +1is smaller than the inequality in the distribution of income at
date t.
Obviously, this model ignores other types of intergenerational transfers,
besides provision of education, such as monetary transfers from parents to
children. Existence of such transfers may aﬀect the above result.
Proof. Let us show ﬁrst that in each generation individuals with higher
level of human capital choose at the optimum higher level of time to be
15allocated for private education of their oﬀspring. To see this let us derive from
the ﬁrst order conditions, using some manipulation, the following equation:











which demonstrates that higher ht(ω) implies higher level of et(ω).L e t u s
show that such a property generates less equality in the ditribution of yt+1(ω)
compared to that of yt(ω). It is useful however, to apply (18) for this issue.
In fact it represents the period t+1income yt+1(ω) as a function of the date t
income yt(ω) via the human capital evolution. Deﬁne the function Q : R → R
such that Q[ht(ω)] = ht+1(ω) using (18). This monotone increasing function
satisﬁes: Q(x) > 0 for any x>0 and
Q(x)
x is decreasing in x. Therefore [see,
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)], the human capital distribution ht+1(ω) is
more equal than the ditribution in date t, ht(ω). This implies that yt+1(ω) is
more equal than yt(ω).
4E n d o g e n o u s G r o w t h
In the last few decades economists have shown great interest in the impact of
income inequality on economic growth. The main empirical ﬁndings indicate
that the conjecture of a negative eﬀect holds (see, e.g. Persson and Tabellini
(1994)). More recent evidence diﬀers depending on the sample period, the
sample of countries and on whether time-series or cross-section estimation
techniques are used (see, e.g., Forbes (2000)). The aim of this section is to
explore the relationship between inequality and growth in this framework.
Our explanation will be based on the extent of externalities in the process of
human capital accumulation.
Let us consider ﬁrst the eﬀect that technological improvement in the
production of human capital will have on output in equilibrium. Consider
(1) and remember that we call the ﬁrst term on the RHS, β1et(ω)hυ
t(ω),t h e
home-component, and the second term, β2egth
η
t,t h epublic-component. Now
we prove:
Proposition 6 Consider the human capital production process given by (1).
The following types of technological improvements result in :
16(a) Increasing the eﬃciency of the public-component, or increasing η or
both, will result in higher output in all periods.
(b) Increasing the eﬃciency of the home-component, or increasing v or
both, will increase output in all dates.
Proof. Let us just sketch the proof of this claim. Any technological
improvement, either in the public-component or the home-component, will
imply higher human capital stock as of period 1 and on. Since, the initial
capital stock is given this will increase the output in date 1 and, hence, the
aggregate savings in this period. Thus the output in date 2 will be higher
and hence the capital stock to be used as well. This process continues in all
coming periods.
Corollary 7 (a) In the following two cases of technological improvement
in the home-component we obtain higher economic growth coupled with less
inequality in the distributions of income: (i) an increase in β1 (ii) an increase
in v.
(b) When technological improvement in the public-component occurs, hence
either β2 or η increases, then higher growth is accompanied by more equality
in the distribution of incomes.
If we consider the computor-information revolution as a technological im-
provement in enhancing knowledge, then we ask whether the home-component
beneﬁts more than the public- component in the formation process of human
capital. We believe that computors and internet has enhanced the home-
education considerably, while schools beneﬁt only in a limited manner. Part
(a) of our Corollary may provide some explanation to the recent widespread
phenomena (mostly during the nineties) that in the OECD countries eco-
nomic growth is accompanied by increasing inequality in the distribution of
income.




















17Now let us consider the eﬀect of technological improvements in the human
capital production on the rate of growth in human capital stock. First we
assume technological progress in the home-component.
Proposition 8 Let η ≤ 1 and v ≤ 1. Assume that a technological improve-
ment occurs in the home-component of the human capital production process.
Then, the growth factor γt of the human capital declines in all dates.
Proof. Assume that we have an increase in the parameter υ, while other
parameters remain unchanged. We shall apply now the result of Proposi-
tion 2. Increasing v (or β1) will increase human capital distribution’s in-
equality; therefore, [ht ]−1ht(ω) becomes more dispersed (in the sense of
mean-preserving spread). Hence, for any strictly concave function its ex-
pected value declines; in particular, this implies that [ht ]−v R
hv
t(ω) dµ(ω)





t declines as well as h
η−1
t and, by the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2,ht increases. Thus, by (21), it is easy to see that as a
result of a rise in v we obtain lower values for γt. Using the above expression
for γt it can be shown that the same result holds when we increase β1.H e r e ,
we should apply the fact that multiplying β1 by a factor λ > 1 the ﬁrst term
on the RHS of equation (21) declines since v<1,w h i l et h es e c o n dt e r m ,
which includes h
η−1
t declines since (again using the proof of Proposition 2)
ht increases. This completes the proof.
5 Numerical Simulations
The aim of this section is to introduce a dynamic computable general equi-
librium model with heterogenous agents and to characterize the properties of
the equilibria of the model discussed above. In particular, we are interested in
establishing the relationship between changes in technology parameters and
the growth and distribution of income that can be sustained in equilibrium.
Though the eﬀects of most changes in parameters of the model have been
described in the preceding propositions, it is important to quantify these ef-
fects in various situations. To facilitate the interpretation of our theoretical
results the ﬁrst set of numerical simulations assume that the sequence of τt
18is exogenously given. Then we allow for the tax rate to be endogenously
determined through majority voting.
Exogenous Public Education




t , that is wt = A(1−θ)(kt/(1 − τt)ht)
θ and (1+rt)=
Aθ((1 − τt)ht/kt)
1−θ . In the baseline case, we assume that the economy is in
a steady-state. To characterize the latter, consider Eqs. (2), (11), (16) and






(1 + rt) (22)














which describes the dynamic path of the capital-labor ratio of the econ-
omy. In the long-run kt+1/ht+1 = kt/ht is a constant k/h if τt = τ and γt = γ.
The time-independence of γ can be obtained by incorporating externalities
that yield constant returns to scale to parents’ and society’s human capital
in (1), namely assuming υ = η =1 . In that case we obtain the long-run






























Long-run economic growth coincides with the eﬀective labor growth fac-
tor γ, regardless of initial conditions. Our model in the stationary state is
19therefore an AK-type endogenous growth model where all variables grow at
the rate (γ − 1).
Besides υ = η =1 , we assume that the other baseline parameters are
k−1 =5 5 .78, τ =0 .2, α1 = α2 = α4 =1 , α3 =2 ,A=4 , θ = .3 and
β1 = β2 =1 .6. We consider a discrete number of heterogenous families,
namely 11, with a human capital at t = −1 taking the values 1,2,...11.
The initial endowments in physical and human capital were chosen with two
criteria in mind. First, the values of the endogenous variables that follow
from these initial conditions and parameter values are long-run values at all
dates. Second, the initial heterogeneity in human capital calibrates an exact
Gini coeﬃcient close to the European average, namely 0.303. The following








|yi − yj| (26)
where n represents the number of families, yt is average income, yi and
yj are individual incomes.
Given the set of baseline parameters of the model, the equilibrium path of
all variables belonging to a particular family is obtained in two steps. First,
the human capital of any individual at date t is given by (18). Aggregating
the levels of human capital across individuals and equating the aggregate
capital stock at date t to the aggregate savings at date t − 1 (see 11)),
we obtain aggregate production qt, the equilibrium wt and (1 + rt). Upon
this information, each individual derives his/her income yt(ω) from (2) and
summary statistics like the Gini coeﬃcient can be computed. Second, given
the time path of wages, marginal returns to physical capital and income of
each dynasty, each individual can compute et(ω),c 1t(ω),c 2t(ω), and ut(ω).
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the solution for our baseline case (repro-
duced in all subsequent tables) and the comparative statics of changes in υ
and η. In the numerical simulations, given the chosen parameters we solve the
model for 200 periods. As patterns emerge within 20 periods we discard the
last 180 periods and compute the relevant statistics averaging over the ﬁrst
10 periods and over the second 10 periods. This table indicates that inequal-
ity as measured by Gini coeﬃcients is sensitive to externalities arising from
the home component but not to externalities arising from the public part of
human capital formation. Decreasing returns in parents’ human capital (col-
umn 2) reduce inequality substantially, all individuals becoming equal in the
20long-run. In contrast income divergence is observed with increasing returns
(column 3). In column 2, increased equality is obtained at the expense of
growth, whether measured in terms of income or human capital.
Table 2 looks at a technological improvement in human capital formation
represented here by rises in the β
0s. Columns 2 to 4 show that a greater
eﬃciency in education is conducive to growth while not aﬀecting income
distributions. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows the stronger impact
that parental education has on growth.
It is important to note a diﬀerence between our theoretical results and
those of Tables 1 and 2. The former predict eﬀects on the income distribu-
tion as a result of changes in the process of human capital formation which
are stronger than those obtained from our numerical simulations. A reason
lies in the use of the concept of second order stochastic dominance in most
proofs. For example, when looking at income distribution, a mean preserving
spread change maintains average income yt unchanged. In contrast, in our
numerical simulations, average income yt v a r i e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h es c e n a r i o s
under consideration. As it enters directly in formula (26) of the Gini coeﬃ-
cient, most results on income distribution diﬀer and become negligible except
when dealing with υ.
Majority Voting
Though there is a growing awareness of governments in education, en-
hancing human capital skills require ﬁnancial resources to cover the invest-
ment. Though the majority of constituents recognize the importance of learn-
ing, they are not prepared to contribute ﬁnancially via income taxes in the
same way. To establish the preferences of each individual with respect to
τt(ω) let us compute the reduced-form utility of each agent. Substituting










where Ωt groups all parameters and variables like factor rewards which
are given to atomistic individuals. Knowing that each agent cannot enforce
21any tax rate at the future date, i.e. τt+1(ω) is given to him, the maximization
of (27) with respect to τt(ω) gives:
τt(ω)=
(α3 + α4)
(α1 + α2 + α3 + α4)
−
(α1 + α2)





22Table 1 Baseline and Other Speciﬁcation Externalities
Externalities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
υ 1. 8 11 . 1 1
η 11. 8 1 1 . 1
Relative factor returns .47 .325 .406 .809 .556
(1 + rt)/wt .47 .330 .394 3.53 .668
Gini coeﬃcient (gt) .303 .15 .303 .415 .303
(income) .303 .03 .303 .633 .303
Growth rate (%) 28. -1.4 15.3 85.8 43.6
(aggr. output) 28. .0 13.0 large 63.3
Growth rate (%) 28. -2.4 14.7 90.9 44.6
(aggr. human capital) 28. .0 12.9 large 64.5
Parental education (et) .6 .587 .627 .610 .569
(poorest agent) .6 .578 .636 .635 .516
23Table 2 Baseline and Other Speciﬁcation Eﬃciency
Eﬃciency (1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 1.6 1.76 1.6 1.76
β2 1.6 1.6 1.76 1.76
Relative factor returns .47 .526 .482 .537
(1 + rt)/wt .47 .528 .483 .540
Gini coeﬃcient (gt) .303 .303 .303 .303
(income) .303 .303 .303 .303
Growth rate (%) 28. 38.2 30.0 40.2
(aggr. output) 28. 38.7 30.1 40.8
Growth rate 28. 38.7 30.1 40.8
(aggr. human capital) 28. 38.7 30.1 40.8
Parental education (et) .6 .606 .593 .6
(poorest agent) .6 .606 .593 .6
24Each agent chooses the optimal τt(ω) such that the cost of current spend-
ing on education (in terms of foregone current and future consumption) is
equal to the reward of a marginal increase in the human capital of their
children. It is clear that the heterogeneity in τt(ω) derives from the hetero-
geneity in human capital. When η ≤ 1 and v<1 below-average agents are
willing to pay a tax rate lower than above-average agents. When η = v =1 ,
τt(ω)=τ. In terms of our numerical simulations, the ﬁrst step produces a
vector of τt(ω) based on (28). Given this vector of individual preferences for
education expenditure, we assume that the level of public schooling is ob-
tained at each date through majority voting. Numerically, majority voting
boils down to identifying the median voter’s preference for public schooling.
Tables 3 and 4 repeat the comparative statics of Tables 1 and 2, now
with endogenous public education. The simulation results of these tables
establish a substitution in equilibrium between public education and parental
education: an increase in τt decreases the time spent on parental education
et and hence, raises leisure. This substitution among types of provision of
education has a number of implications, one of which being that growth rates
are all positive now. For the rest, results conﬁrm a positive relationship
between income inequality and income growth in only one type of scenarios,
namely when externalities arising from parents’ human capital vary.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In our framework a technological change in the aggregate production function
will not have an impact on the distribution of income. Therefore, we consider
only technological improvements in the human capital accumulation process.
As we show, in this case, the eﬀect is ambiguous: it depends on the manner
in which it aﬀects the process. It is important to note that introducing
intergenerational transfers in our model will modify the results: in such a
case, technological progress in the aggregate production function may have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the intragenerational income distributions [see Karni and
Zilcha (1994)].
Our theoretical analysis does not depend on the levels of the public pro-
vision of education, {egt}. The choice of some ’optimal’ level of public edu-
cation requires some social welfare function due to the heterogeneity of the
25households. However, the majority voting criterion is widely used in eco-
nomic theory, hence, one can determine this level using the median voter’s
optimal choice. This has been used in our numerical simulations. This frame-
work can be generalized by introducing an additional redistributive measures
by the government, such as social security. This may vary some of our results.
26Table 3 Externalities and Median Voter
Externalities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
υ 1 . 81 1 . 11
η 11. 8 1 1 . 1
Tax rate (rt) .20 .335 .01 0.031 .339
.20 .358 .0 .0 .480
Relative factor returns .47 .422 .310 .573 .830
(1 + rt)/wt .47 .431 .291 1.85 2.52
Gini coeﬃcient (gt) .303 .162 .303 .424 .303
(income) .303 .044 .303 .656 .303
Growth rate (%) 28. 4.0 11.3 67.8 64.1
(aggr. output) 28. 3.1 6.7 large large
Growth rate (%) 28. 5.2 7.6 67.7 71.9
(aggr. human capital) 28. 3.2 6.7 large large
Parental education (et) .6 .522 .666 .657 .485
(poorest agent) .6 .478 .667 .667 .057
27Table 4 Eﬃciency and Median Voter
Eﬃciency (1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 1.6 1.76 1.6 1.76
β2 1.6 1.6 1.76 1.76
Tax rate (τt) .20 .16 .236 .20
.20 .16 .236 .20
Relative factor returns .47 .485 .522 .537
(1 + rt)/wt .47 .481 .529 .540
Gini coeﬃcient (gt) .303 .303 .303 .303
(income) .303 .303 .303 .303
Growth rate (%) 28. 35.2 33.1 40.2
(aggr. output) 28. 34.4 34.4 40.8
Growth rate (%) 28. 34.8 34.0 40.8
(aggr. human capital) 28. 34.4 34.4 40.8
Parental education (et) .6 .617 .581 .6
(poorest agent) .6 .618 .580 .6
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